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Abstract
We study the problem of a buyer (aka auctioneer) who gains
stochastic rewards by procuring multiple units of a service or
item from a pool of heterogeneous strategic agents. The reward
obtained for a single unit from an allocated agent depends on
the inherent quality of the agent; the agent’s quality is fixed
but unknown. Each agent can only supply a limited number of
units (capacity of the agent). The costs incurred per unit and
capacities are private information of the agents. The auctioneer
is required to elicit costs as well as capacities (making the mech-
anism design bidimensional) and further, learn the qualities of
the agents as well, with a view to maximize her utility. Moti-
vated by this, we design a bidimensional multi-armed bandit
procurement auction that seeks to maximize the expected util-
ity of the auctioneer subject to incentive compatibility and in-
dividual rationality while simultaneously learning the unknown
qualities of the agents. We first assume that the qualities are
known and propose an optimal, truthful mechanism 2D-OPT
for the auctioneer to elicit costs and capacities. Next, in order
to learn the qualities of the agents in addition, we provide suffi-
cient conditions for a learning algorithm to be Bayesian incen-
tive compatible and individually rational. We finally design a
novel learning mechanism, 2D-UCB that is stochastic Bayesian
incentive compatible and individually rational.
1 Introduction
Auction based mechanisms are widely used to allocate goods
or services in the presence of strategic agents. In different con-
texts, the auctioneer may have different goals such as welfare
maximization or utility maximization or revenue maximization
or cost minimization. Auction theory generally assumes that
the players are symmetric which means they are distinguished
only by privately held types such as costs, valuations, or ca-
pacities. The theory does not consider the “experience” of an
auctioneer resulting from the consumption of the commodity
or service. The experience can be uncertain and not known up-
front. For example, consider a hospital (auctioneer) interested
in procuring a large number of units of a single generic drug
from various pharmaceuticals who can supply limited quanti-
ties at different production costs. The quality of the procured
generic drug from a supplier can depend on several parameters
such as methodology used in preparation and other parameters
which are inherent to the supplier. In this example and sev-
eral other real world scenarios, there is an inherent heterogene-
ity amongst services or items procured from different agents.
Therefore, we can attribute to every agent an inherent quality
which is a measure of the perceived experience or reward. Thus,
in order to maximize her utility, the auctioneer needs to mini-
mize her payments at the same time ensure a required quality
of service. If the qualities from different agents are observed re-
peatedly, the auctioneer can learn the quality of the agents for
future optimization.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
50
2.
06
93
4v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
8 A
pr
 20
15
A strong motivation for this work comes from the setting of
crowdsourcing. The quality of human generated data or labels
is an important input for an AI process or a machine learning
system. With the advent of several crowdsourcing marketplaces,
such inputs are now obtained at much less cost from a global
pool of heterogeneous crowd workers. These human workers
have different quality levels and can be strategic about their
costs. The risk of low quality levels is mitigated via learning
algorithms which can predict high quality workers while strate-
gic behavior of crowd workers can be addressed via mechanism
design. Thus, the auctioneer here is a requester who seeks to
procure tasks from strategic crowd workers with privately held
costs, privately held capacities, and unknown qualities.
Motivated by situations such as above, we consider a procure-
ment scenario where a buyer (or auctioneer) wishes to procure
multiple units of a service or item from a pool of heteroge-
neous agents with unknown qualities, privately held costs, and
privately held limited capacities. Our goal is to design a pro-
curement auction that learns the qualities of the agents, elicits
true costs and capacities from the agents, and maximizes the
expected utility of the auctioneer. If the agents are honest in
reporting their costs and capacities, the classical Multi-Armed-
Bandit (MAB) techniques can be used to learn the qualities.
For example, Tran-Thanh et. al. [29] have proposed a greedy ap-
proach to learn the qualities of the crowd workers. On the other
hand, if all the agents have the same quality that is common
knowledge but with strategic costs and capacities, the auction-
eer can deploy the techniques available in the literature [11, 16]
to elicit true costs and capacities. In the setting considered in
this paper, in addition to strategic costs and capacities, we also
address heterogeneity amongst agents and moreover we learn
their qualities.
Learning in the presence of strategic agents in a multi armed
bandit (MAB) setting leads to MAB mechanisms [4]. In this
paper, we take a detour from current MAB mechanism theory
in two ways. (i) We propose an optimal MAB mechanism that
performs nearly as well as an optimal auction with full infor-
mation, whereas the current literature mainly focuses on social
welfare maximization (ii) We provide a characterization for a
weaker notion of truthfulness i.e. stochastic Bayesian incentive
compatibility that can potentially achieve better regret bounds.
More importantly, while the existing research is also limited to
learning with agents having single dimensional private informa-
tion, we design an MAB mechanism when the agents’ private
information is two dimensional. In particular, following are the
contributions of this paper:
• We first explore the case of heterogeneous agents with known
qualities and provide a characterization for any Bayesian
Incentive Compatible (BIC) and Individual Rational (IR)
mechanism in a bidimensional setting. Using this charac-
terization, we provide the footprint for a mechanism to be
BIC, IR and maximizes the expected utility of the auctioneer
(Theorem 2). We then propose an optimal mechanism 2D-
OPT which is in fact dominant strategic incentive compatible
(DSIC) and IR (Theorem 3).
• We next take up the case when the qualities are unknown and
derive sufficient conditions for an allocation rule to be imple-
mented in stochastic BIC and IR (Theorem 6).1 This leads
to a learning mechanism 2D-UCB that is stochastic BIC and
IR (Theorem 9). We evaluate 2D-UCB through simulations
and show that the expected utility of an auctioneer adopt-
ing 2D-UCB mechanism approaches that of the omniscient
2D-OPT.
2 Positioning of our Work
An extensive study of auction theory and mechanism design can
be found in [18]. The notion of optimal auction was introduced
by Myerson [22]. Subsequently, there were many significant re-
sults in single parameter domains, however, the multiple param-
eter domain was unexplored until recently. The readers are re-
ferred to [12, 21] for more details on optimal multi-dimensional
mechanism design. The settings addressed in most of the lit-
erature assume additive valuation. In our work, cost and ca-
pacity parameters constitute the private information and the
valuation of the agents is not additive in these two parameters.
Notably, Iyengar and Kumar [16] have designed optimal single
item multi unit auction for capacitated bidders and this is fur-
ther developed by Gujar and Narahari [11] for multi-item multi
unit auctions. However, as pointed out in Section 1, the above
works [11, 16] assume that all agents are of the same quality.
In our setting, the agents are heterogeneous and their qualities
need to be learnt.
If we assume honest agents, the multi-armed-bandit theory [3,
19] is applicable to learn the qualities of the agents. Upper
confidence bound based algorithms have been designed to learn
unknown quantities with logarithmic regrets [8]. In the specific
context of crowdsourcing, much research has been carried out
for learning qualities of the crowd workers [1, 2, 7, 13, 14, 15, 26,
1Note that, this is sufficient condition and the complete characterization
is still open.
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27, 28, 30]. In a pure learning setting devoid of strategic play,
the closest setting to ours is the one in Tran-Thanh et al. [29]
which studies the problem in the context of crowdsourcing to
maximize the number of successful tasks under a fixed budget.
Note that all the above papers assume costs are known.
A learning algorithm can be potentially manipulated by a
strategic agent so as to increase utility. This problem is ad-
dressed using MAB mechanism design theory [4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 17,
20, 25]. Most of the literature in this space (except [5]) consid-
ers strategic agents with single dimensional private information
and seeks to maximize social welfare. Our work, on the other
hand, seeks to maximize the expected utility of the auctioneer.
The work in [5] considers a multi-parameter setting and seeks to
maximize welfare, but with an additive valuation model where
the valuation of each agent is a linear combination of different
private values. Our work is different from [5] as we aim to de-
sign an optimal auction in a capacitated setting where additive
valuations do not apply.
3 Notation and Preliminaries
An auctioneer wishes to procure L units of an item from an
agent poolN = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let qi ∈ [0, 1] represent the quality
of agent i, let ci ∈ [ci, ci] be his true cost and let ki ∈ [ki, ki]
represent the maximum number of units an agent can provide
or his true capacity. Let, q, c, k denote the vectors of qualities,
costs and capacities respectively. We consider a linear reward
function for the auctioneer and she obtains an expected reward
of Rqi on procuring an unit from agent i where R is a fixed
positive real number.
In this work, we make an important and reasonable assump-
tion that the agent is not allowed to over-report his capacity.
This is because if the auctioneer allocates the agent beyond his
capacity, it is detected eventually when the agent fails to de-
liver. This could lead to imposition of a high penalty or may
lead to blacklisting the agent from further participation. In con-
trast to over-reporting, under-reporting of capacity cannot be
detected. In the absence of proper incentives, an agent can cre-
ate virtual scarcity of agents by under-reporting his capacity
which can benefit him.
We denote the reported cost by cˆi ∈ [ci, ci] and the reported
capacity by kˆi ∈ [ki, ki]. Let bi = (cˆi, kˆi) denote the bid of agent
i and the bid vector of all the agents except i is denoted by b−i.
The objective of the auctioneer is to maximize the expected
reward from L units of the item and at the same time also
minimize the payments to the agents, ensuring that from each
agent i at most kˆi units are procured. If all the parameters are
known, then one can solve the following optimization problem
which maximizes the utility of the auctioneer:
max
n∑
i=1
(
xiRqi − ti
)
s.t. xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , kˆi} ,
∑
i
xi ≤ L, (1)
where, xi represents the number of units that are procured
from an agent i and ti denotes the payment given to an
agent i. The total number of units procured from the agents
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) (allocation) and the payments made to
the agents t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) form the mechanism denoted by
M = (x, t). Note that the allocation x and payment t depend
on the bids reported by the agents and the qualities. We as-
sume an independent private value model, and that the joint
probability density function denoted by fi(ci, ki) is common
knowledge. Let X and T denote the expected allocations and
expected payments when expectation is taken over bids of other
agents. That is, Xi(cˆi, kˆi; qi) represents the expected number of
units procured from agent i when he bids cost per item cˆi, bids
capacity kˆi and the quality is qi. Similarly Ti’s are defined. We
now define some desirable properties for a mechanism if quali-
ties were known.
Definition 1 (Bayesian Incentive Compatible) A mecha-
nism is called Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if report-
ing truthfully gives an agent highest expected utility when the
other agents are truthful, with the expectation taken over type
profiles of other agents. Formally, ∀i ∈ N, ∀cˆi, ci ∈ [ci, ci],∀kˆi ∈
[ki, ki],
Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; q) ≥ Ui(cˆi, kˆi, ci, ki; q),
where, Ui(cˆi, kˆi, ci, ki; q) = Eb−i [cixi(cˆi, kˆi; q) + ti(cˆi, kˆi; q)]
Definition 2 (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compati-
ble) A mechanism is called Dominant Strategy Incentive Com-
patible (DSIC) if reporting truthfully gives every agent highest
utility irrespective of the bids of the other agents. Formally,
∀i ∈ N, ∀cˆi, ci ∈ [ci, ci],∀kˆi ∈ [ki, ki], ∀cˆ−i, ∀kˆ−i,
ui(ci, cˆ−i, ki, kˆ−i, c, k; q) ≥ ui(cˆi, cˆ−i, kˆi, kˆ−i, c, k; q)
where ui(cˆi, cˆ−i, kˆi, kˆ−i, c, k; q) = cixi(cˆ, kˆ; q) + ti(cˆ, kˆ; q) is the
utility when the true bid profile is c, k and agent i reports cˆi, kˆi.
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Definition 3 (Individually Rational) A mechanism is
called Individually Rational (IR) if no agent derives nega-
tive utility by participating in the mechanism. Formally, ∀i ∈
N, ∀ci ∈ [ci, ci],∀ki ∈ [ki, ki],
ui(ci, ki, c, k; q) ≥ 0
Definition 4 (Optimal Mechanism) A mechanism M =
(x, t) is called optimal if it maximizes eq. (1) subject to BIC
and IR.
4 Auction with Known Qualities
We now derive the characterization for any mechanism to be
BIC and IR when the qualities are known.
4.1 Characterization
In the setting considered in the paper, as described in section 3,
VCG mechanisms can be used to elicit the costs and capacities
from the agents and it satisfies DSIC, IR. However, VCG mech-
anisms maximize social welfare and may or may not be utility
maximizing for the auctioneer [23].
Any allocation should be compensated with at least the cost
incurred by the agent, irrespective of the quality of the unit
procured. We propose to pay a premium to each agent above his
true cost so as to incentivize him to report costs and capacities
truthfully. We define ∀i ∈ N,
ρi(bi; q) = Ti(bi; q)− cˆiXi(bi; q), where bi = (cˆi, kˆi).
The utility of an agent i with bid bi is given as,
Ui(bi, ci, ki; q) = Ti(bi; q)− ciXi(bi; q)
= ρi(bi; q)− (ci − cˆi)Xi(bi; q) (2)
Thus ρi represents the offered utility when all the agents are
truthful. With the above offered incentive, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 A mechanism is BIC and IR iff ∀i ∈ N ,
1. Xi(cˆi, kˆi; q) is non-increasing in cˆi, ∀q and ∀kˆi ∈ [ki, ki].
2. ρi(cˆi, kˆi; q) is non-negative, and non-decreasing in kˆi ∀ q and
∀ cˆi ∈ [ci, c¯i]
3. ρi(cˆi, kˆi; q) = ρi(c¯i, kˆi; q) +
∫ ci
cˆi
Xi(z, kˆi; q)dz
We refer to the above three statements as conditions 1, 2 and
3 respectively.
Proof: To prove the necessity part, we first observe due to BIC,
Ui(cˆi, kˆi, ci, ki; q) ≤ Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; q) ∀(cˆi, kˆi) and (ci, ki)
=⇒ Ui(cˆi, ki, ci, ki; q) ≤ Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; q)
We assume cˆi > ci. The proof follows in identical lines other-
wise. From eq. (2),
Ui(cˆi, ki, ci, ki; q) = Ui(cˆi, ki, cˆi, ki; q) + (cˆi − ci)Xi(cˆi, ki; q),
which implies that,
Ui(cˆi, ki, cˆi, ki; q)− Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; q)
cˆi − ci ≤ −Xi(cˆi, ki; q).
Similarly using Ui(ci, ki, cˆi, ki; q) ≤ Ui(cˆi, ki, cˆi, ki; q),
−Xi(ci, ki; q) ≤ Ui(cˆi, ki, cˆi, ki; q)− Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; q)
cˆi − ci
≤ −Xi(cˆi, ki; q). (3)
Taking limit cˆi → ci, we get,
∂Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; q)
∂ci
= −Xi(ci, ki; q). (4)
Equation (3) implies, Xi(ci, ki; q) is non-increasing in ci. This
proves condition 1 of the theorem in the forward direction.
When the worker bids truthfully, from Equation (2),
ρi(ci, ki; q) = Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; q). (5)
For BIC, Equation (4) should be true. So,
ρi(ci, ki; q) = ρi(c¯i, ki; q) +
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(z, ki; q)dz (6)
This proves condition 3 of the theorem. BIC also requires,
ki ∈ arg max
kˆi∈[ki,ki]
Ui(ci, kˆi, ci, ki; q) ∀ ci ∈ [ci, c¯i]
This implies, ∀ci, ρi(ci, ki; q) should be non-decreasing in ki.
The IR conditions (Equation(5)) imply
ρi(ci, ki; q) ≥ 0.
This proves condition 2 of the theorem. Thus, these three con-
ditions are necessary for BIC and IR properties. We now prove
the sufficiency. Consider
Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; q) = ρi(ci, ki; q) ≥ 0.
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So the IR property is satisfied. We assume cˆi > ci. The proof
is similar for the case cˆi < ci. To establish BIC, consider:
Ui(cˆi, kˆi, ci, ki; q)
= ρi(cˆi, kˆi; q) + (cˆi − ci)Xi(cˆi, kˆi; q) (By Defn)
= ρi(c¯i, kˆi; q) +
∫ c¯i
cˆi
Xi(z, kˆi; q)dz + (cˆi − ci)Xi(cˆi, kˆi)
(By hypothesis)
= ρi(c¯i, kˆi; q) +
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(z, kˆi; q)dz
−
∫ cˆi
ci
Xi(z, kˆi; q)dz + (cˆi − ci)Xi(cˆi, kˆi; q)
≤ ρi(ci, kˆi; q) (Xi is non-increasing in ci)
≤ ρi(ci, ki; q) ( as ρi is non-decreasing in ki)
= Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; q) 
4.2 Sufficiency Conditions for Optimality
We now present sufficiency conditions for an IR, BIC mecha-
nism to be optimal. Let Fi(ci|ki) and fi(ci|ki) denote respec-
tively the cumulative distribution and probability density func-
tion of cost of an agent i given the capacity.
Theorem 2 Suppose the allocation rule maximizes
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
(
Rqi −
(
ci +
Fi(ci|ki)
fi(ci|ki)
))
xi(ci, ki, c−i, k−i)f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn) dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn (7)
subject to conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 1. Also suppose that
the payment is given by
Ti(ci, ki; q) = ciXi(ci, ki; q) +
∫ ci
ci
Xi(z, ki; q)dz (8)
then such a payment scheme and allocation scheme constitute
an optimal auction satisfying BIC and IR.
Proof: The auctioneer’s objective is to maximize her expected
utility which is:
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
[
Rqixi(b; q)− ti(b; q)
]
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn)dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn
=
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
[
xi(b; q)(Rqi − ci + ci)− ti(b; q)
]
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn)dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn
=
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
(
cixi(b; q)− ti(b; q)
)
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn)dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn
+
n∑
i=1
∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
(
Rqi − ci
)
xi(ci, ki, c−i, k−i)
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn) dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn (9)
The second term of eq. (9) is already similar to the desired form
of the objective function of auctioneer given in eq. (7). We now
use conditions 1 and 3 of Theorem 1 to arrive at the result.
Consider the first term,∫ c¯1
c1
. . .
∫ c¯n
cn
∫ k¯1
k1
. . .
∫ k¯n
kn
(
cixi(b; q)− ti(b; q)
)
f1(c1, k1) . . . fn(cn, kn)dc1 . . . dcn dk1 . . . dkn
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
ρi(ci, ki; q)fi(ci, qi)dci dki (Integrating out b−i)
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
(
ρi(c¯i, ki) +
∫ c¯i
ci
X(z, ki; q)dz
)
fi(ci, ki)dci dki
(As we need truthfulness)
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
ρi(c¯i, ki)fi(ci, ki)dci dki
−
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(z, ki; q)dz
∫ z
ci
fi(ci|ki)dci fi(ki)dki
(Changing order of integration)
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
ρi(c¯i, ki)fi(ci, ki)dci dki
−
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(z, ki; q)Fi(z|ki)dzfi(ki)dki
= −
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
ρi(c¯i, ki)fi(ci, ki)dci dki
−
∫ k¯i
ki
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(ci, ki; q)
Fi(ci|ki)
fi(ci|ki) fi(ci, ki)dci dki (10)
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The last step is obtained by relabeling the variable of integra-
tion and simplifying.
Here, ρi(c¯i, ki) denotes the utility of an agent i when his
true type is (c¯i, ki). With this type profile, the auctioneer
by paying c¯i can ensure both IR and IC, hence we can set
ρi(c¯i, ki) = 0,∀ki ∈ [ki, k¯i]. Applying this in the above equa-
tion, we get that the objective function of the auctioneer is
similar in form to eq. (7). Consider Condition 3 of Theorem 1,
and set ρi(c¯i, ki) = 0, we get eq. (8). By construction, the
mechanism is BIC and IR. And, since the auctioneer’s expected
utility is maximized the mechanism is optimal. 
Analogous to the literature on optimal auction [11, 16, 22],
we assume regularity on our type distribution as follows.
Definition 5 (Regularity) We define the virtual cost func-
tion ∀i ∈ N as
Hi(ci, ki) := ci +
Fi(ci|ki)
fi(ci|ki)
We say that a type distribution is regular if ∀i, Hi is non-
decreasing in ci and non-increasing in ki.
This assumption is not restrictive in single dimension setting
as standard techniques of ironing are available [22]. The ironing
techniques can also be applied in bidimensional setting when-
ever the marginal cost distribution is independent of marginal
capacity distribution.
4.3 2D-OPT: An Optimal Auction
We now present our mechanism 2D-OPT give in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3 Mechanism 2D-OPT is optimal, DSIC and IR.
Proof: We will prove that 2D-OPT satisfies Theorem 2, which
proves optimality, IR, and BIC. The allocation function (AL-
LOC) allocates maximum possible units to agents in decreasing
order of G’s, which in turn maximizes eq. (7). This is because
eq. (7) is a linear combination of G’s. The monotonicity con-
straint 1 of Theorem 1 is satisfied due to regularity.
Fix an agent i with non-zero allocation. We will show that the
payment given to the agent i given by 2D-OPT is the same as
in eq. (8). We fix a bid profile b−i, that yields non-zero allocation
to agent i. The payment to agent i for bid profile (bi, b−i) as
per eq. (8) is as follows.
ti(ci, ki, b−i; q) = cixi(ci, ki, b−i; q) +
∫ ci
ci
xi(z, ki, b−i; q)dz (11)
ALGORITHM 1: 2D-OPT Mechanism
Input: ∀i, Bids bi = (cˆi kˆi), reward parameter R
Output: An optimal, DSIC, IR Mechanism M = (x, t)
1 Allocation is given by x = ALLOC(N, cˆ, kˆ, q, L)
2 for i ∈ N && xi 6= 0 do
3 Gi := Rqi −Hi(bi)
4 y = ALLOC(N \ {i}, cˆ−i, (kˆ−i − x−i), q−i, xi)
5 Payment to i, ti =∑
k∈N\{i}
yk max(G
−1
i (Rqk −Hk(bk)), c¯i) +
(
xi −
∑
k
yk
)
c¯i
6 end
1 Subroutine: ALLOC(Nτ , cτ , kτ , qτ , Lτ )
Input: 〈Nτ , cτ , kτ , qτ , Lτ 〉 where
Nτ =: Set of agents,
cτ =: Bid vector of costs,
kτ =: Bid vector of capacities,
qτ =: Vector of qualities,
Lτ =: Total number of units being allocated.
Output: Vector x of units allocated to each agent.
2 for κ ∈ Nτ do
3 Hκ(c
τ
κ, k
τ
κ) = c
τ
κ +
Fκ(c
τ
κ|kτκ)
fκ(cτκ|kκ)
4 Gκ := Rq
τ
κ −Hκ(cτκ, kτκ)
5 end
6 (a1, a2, . . .) = Sorted indices of agents in N
τ in non-increasing
order of Gκ
7 x = 0
8 L(1) = Lτ
9 for 1 ≤ η ≤ |Nτ | && Gaη ≥ 0 do
10 xaη = max(k
τ
aη , L
(η))
11 L(η+1) = L(η) − xaη
12 end
If expectation is taken on b−i for eq. (11), we get eq. (8). The
interchange of integral and expectation required therein is valid
due to Fubini’s Theorem [24] as the integrand is finite and non-
negative. We will show that 2D-OPT computes this payment
for any b−i.
To compute RHS of eq. (11), we first observe that when bid-
der i alone increases his bid, he can lose some (or all) of the
units allocated to him to bidders with lower values of G. Hence,
the allocation to agent i as a function of his bid z ∈ [ci, c¯i] is
a step function as shown in Figure 1. And, the payment to be
given to agent i as per eq. (11) is the shaded area.
Let g(1) < g(2) < . . . ... < g(m) where g(1) > ci, g
(m) < ci,
be the costs at which agent i loses some more of his units. At
6
zxi(z, ki, b−i; q)
A B
CD E
FG
P Q
RS T
UV
ci g(1) g(2) g(m) ci
. . .
. . .
y(1)
y(2)
y(m)
xi(b; q)−
m∑
j=0
y(j)
Figure 1: Allocation to agent i as function of his bid z
these points, the allocation also dictates that an allocated agent
r either completely exhausts the units xi allocated previously
to i or he himself has no more capacity left.
On the other hand, the payment scheme of 2D-OPT first de-
termines the allocation of xi(ci, ki, c−i, k−i) units in the absence
of i as given by algorithm 1 of algorithm 1.
Let U =: {j ∈ N \ {i} : yj 6= 0} where y is the allocation
to the worker set N \ {i}. We will partition the set U into
V =: {j ∈ N \ {i} : yj 6= 0, Gi(c¯i) < Gj < Gi(ci)} and
W =: {j ∈ N \ {i} : yj 6= 0, 0 < Gj < Gi(c¯i)}. With out
loss of generality, we will assume Gi(c¯i) ≥ 0, otherwise we will
relabel G−1i (0) as c¯i. No allocations are made to agents with
negative value of G(see line 9 of ALLOC). Also, as allocation
of xi units consider residual capacity (kˆ−i − x−i) (see line 4 of
algorithm 1), no agent with G higher than Gi(ci) will have any
capacity left.
For the sake of simpler exposition, we will assume U = V ∪W ,
the proof follows similar lines otherwise. Let (a1, a2, ..., am) as
the indices of agents in V sorted in non-increasing order of G.
Now, agents are allocated units from xi in the order given by
(ak)
m
k=1. Now, it follows that G
−1
i (Rqa1 −Ha1(ba1)) = g(1) and
the allocation to this agent a1 corresponds to y
(1). This forms
the term ya1G
−1((Rqa1 − Ha1(ba1)) of the payment to i and
corresponds to the area of rectangle ABCD. Similarly, the pay-
ment to i due to a2 corresponds area of rectangle DEFG. This
holds for all agents in the set V and rectangle PQRS denotes
the payment due to am. Finally, rectangle STUV corresponds
to agents in W or units that are unallocated as there is no ca-
pacity left in the remaining agents. The latter is captured by
the term (xi −
∑
k yk)c¯i. Hence proposed payment computes
eq. (8) as we have shown it for any fixed b−i.
The offered utility ρi when all agents are truthful is non-
decreasing in the true capacity ki. This is due to the greedy
nature of the allocation in ALLOC. Thus, condition 2 of The-
orem 1 is satisfied.
Thus, 2D-OPT satisfies the Theorem 2. We therefore have
that the proposed mechanism is BIC, IR, and optimal.
In respect of proving DSIC, we omit a formal proof due to
space constraint and provide only a sketch. We note that the
allocation is deterministic and the payment to agent i does not
depend on his bid directly and only depends via the allocation.
Furthermore, the payments are computed based on the alloca-
tions that are made in the absence of i for the xi units he has
been allocated currently. For every unit, the agent is paid the
best possible price he could have bid and still won the unit. 
5 Auction with Unknown Qualities
This section addresses the problem when qualities are not
known and are to be learnt. In order to maximize her utility, the
auctioneer will procure units from agents in a sequential manner
so that she can make future decisions based on the past learn-
ing history. We now discuss definitions relevant in this setting.
Definition 6 (Reward Realization) A reward realization s
is an n × L table where the (i, j) entry represents an indepen-
dent realization drawn from the true quality of ith agent when
procuring the jth unit from him.
Note that (i, j) entry in reward realization indicates the qual-
ity of ith agent when jth unit is procured from him and not the
jth unit procured by the requester.
Definition 7 (Stochastic BIC Mechanism) We say that a
mechanism M = (x, t) is Stochastic BIC if truth telling by any
agent i results in highest expected utility when expectation is
taken over reward realizations and type profiles of other agents.
Formally, ∀cˆi ∈ [ci, ci], kˆi ∈ [ki, ki],
Es[Ui(ci, ki, ci, ki; s)] ≥ Es[Ui(cˆi, kˆi, ci, ki; s)].
5.1 Sufficiency Conditions for Stochastic BIC
We now provide sufficiency conditions for a mechanism to be
stochastic BIC and IR. We begin by stating the modified char-
acterization theorem for the learning setting.
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Theorem 4 Any mechanism that satisfies the following condi-
tions ∀i ∈ N, ∀s ∈ [0, 1]n×L, is stochastic BIC and IR.
1. Xi(ci, ki; s) is non-increasing in ci, ∀s and ∀ki ∈ [ki, ki].
2. ρi(cˆi, kˆi; s) non-negative, and non-decreasing in kˆi ∀s and ∀cˆi
∈ [ci, c¯i].
3. ρi(cˆi, kˆi; s) = ρi(c¯i,kˆi; s) +
∫ c¯i
cˆi
Xi(z, kˆi; s)dz
The proof of the above theorem is similar to that of Theo-
rem 1. Instead of fixing a quality, we are now fixing a reward
realization. The mechanism also remains stochastic BIC and
IR when it satisfies Theorem 4 and expectation is taken over
reward realization.
We now discuss a set of natural properties which a mechanism
in this space ideally have. It also turns out that these properties
are sufficient to ensure BIC and IR.
Definition 8 (Well-Behaved Allocation Rule) An alloca-
tion rule x is called a Well-Behaved Allocation if:
1. Allocation to any agent i for the unit being allocated in round
j, xji , for any reward realization s depends only on the agent’s
bids and the reward realization of j units that are procured
by the auctioneer so far and is non decreasing in terms of
costs.
2. For the unit being allocated in round j and for any three dis-
tinct agents {α, β, γ} such that jth round unit is allocated to
β. A change of bid by agent α should not transfer allocation
of jth round unit from β to γ if other quantities are fixed till
j units.
3. For all reward realizations s, xi(ci, ki; s) is non-decreasing
with increase in capacity ki
As mentioned earlier, these properties are natural. Property
1 states that the allocation should not depend on any future
success realizations which are not observed. Property 2 is simi-
lar to Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property in
the mechanism design theory i.e. if an agent i changes his bid
then it should not affect the allocations of other agents. Prop-
erty 3 states the allocation rule doesn’t penalize an agent with
higher capacity, when other parameters are identical.
Lemma 5 If an allocation rule x is well-behaved then, ∀s, and
∀kˆi ∈ [ki, ki], xi(ci, kˆi; s) is non-increasing in ci.
Proof: By slight abuse of notation, let xi(ci, t) denote the num-
ber of items procured by an agent i with bid ci until j items
are procured. We need to prove that,
xi(ci, j) ≤ xi(c−i , j) ∀c−i ≤ ci
We will prove this by induction. At j = 1, the condition trivially
holds by the monotonicity property of well-behaved allocation
rule. Thus, by induction hypothesis, xi(ci, j) ≤ xi(c−i , j) and
we need to prove that xi(ci, j+ 1) ≤ xi(c−i , j+ 1). Without loss
of generality, we will consider, xi(ci, j) = xi(c
−
i , j), otherwise
the condition is trivially satisfied.
In this case, we will show that xm(ci, j) = xm(c
−
i , j) ∀m.
Note that xm depends on bids of all the agents. Since the cost
of other agents and capacities of all the agents are held fixed,
we have dropped these dependence for notational convenience.
Let x∗(ci, j) denote the number of units that are not procured
by an agent i until j units, i.e. x∗(ci, j) = j − xi(ci, j), we will
prove that for any two units j,j′:
x∗(ci, j) = x∗(c
−
i , j
′) =⇒ xm(ci, j) = xm(c−i , j′) ∀m 6= i
We prove the above statement using induction again. If x∗(ci, j)
= x∗(ci, j′) = 0, that means all the items are procured by
the agent i, the statement is clearly true. Thus, by induc-
tion hypothesis, x∗(ci, j) = x∗(ci, j′) = x∗, then xm(ci, j) =
xm(c
−
i , j
′) ∀m 6= i. Now, suppose x∗(ci, j) = x∗(c−i , j′) = x∗+1.
Again by induction hypothesis, there exist latest rounds, j1 < j
and j′1 < j
′ such that ∀m′ 6= i
x∗(ci, j1) = x∗(c
−
i , j
′
1) = x∗ =⇒ xm′(ci, j1) = xm′(c−i , j′1)
Since j1 and j
′
1 are the latest such rounds, units from j1 + 2
to j and j′1 + 2 to j
′ are procured only by agent i, thus we
need to prove that allocation at round j1 + 1 and j
′
1 + 1 is same
with bid ci and c
−
i respectively. Since agent i is not allocated at
these rounds, by property 2 of well-behaved allocation rule, the
condition is satisfied. Thus, we have xi(ci, j) = xi(c
−
i , j) =⇒
x∗(ci, j) = x∗(c−i , j) =⇒ xm(ci, j) = xm(c−i , j) ∀m
Since the reward realization is fixed, if number of alloca-
tions to all the agents is same till jth unit procured then
by property 1 of well-behaved allocation rule, we have
xi(ci, j + 1) ≤ xi(c−i , j + 1). 
The following theorem guarantees a transformation of any
well-behaved allocation rule into a stochastic BIC and IR mech-
anism.
Theorem 6 For a well-behaved allocation rule, there exists a
transformation that produces the transformed allocation (x˜) and
payment (t˜) such that the resulting mechanism M = (x˜, t˜) is
stochastic BIC and IR.
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If we implement the following payment rule then we will get
stochastic BIC by Theorem 4:
Ti(cˆi, kˆi; s) = cˆiXi(cˆi, kˆi; s) +
∫ ci
cˆi
Xi(z, kˆi; s)dz . (12)
The challenge here is to compute the integral as the allocation
is not known for bid profiles other then cˆ. The allocation therein
depends on how the qualities are learnt. In order to compute
this integral, we adopt a sampling procedure and transforma-
tion that uses Lemma 7 similar to [6].
Lemma 7 Let F : I → [0, 1] be any strictly increasing func-
tion that is differentiable and satisfies infz∈IF(z) = 0 and
supz∈IF(z) = 1. If Y is a random variable with cumulative
distribution function F , then∫
I
g(z)dz = E
[
g(Y )
F ′(Y )
]
. (13)
Our self-resampling procedure is given in Algorithm 2 that
returns vectors α, β based on input bids. These vectors are then
used to compute the allocation and payment.
ALGORITHM 2: Self-resampling Procedure
Input: bid cˆi ∈ [ci, ci], parameter µ ∈ (0, 1)
Output: (αi, βi) such that ci ≥ αi ≥ βi ≥ cˆi
1 with probability (1− µ)
2 αi ← cˆi, βi ← cˆi
3 with probability µ
4 Pick cˆ′i ∈ [cˆi, ci] uniformly at random.
5 αi ← recursive(cˆ′i), βi ← cˆ′i
6 function Recursive(cˆi)
7 with probability (1− µ)
8 return cˆi
9 with probability µ
10 Pick cˆ′i ∈ [cˆi, ci] uniformly at random.
11 return Recursive(cˆ′i)
In order to compute the integral, we need certain properties
to be satisfied that are described in Lemma 8.
Lemma 8 The procedure in Algorithm 2 satisfies the following
properties ∀i ∈ N :
1. αi(cˆi) and βi(cˆi) are non-decreasing functions of cˆi
2. (A) With probability (1− µ), αi(cˆi) = βi(cˆi) = cˆi.
(B) With probability µ, ci ≥ αi(cˆi) ≥ βi(cˆi) > cˆi
3. P[αi(cˆi) > ai|βi(cˆi) = cˆ′i] = P[αi(cˆ′i) > ai] ∀ai ≥ cˆ′i > cˆi.
4. Function F(ai, cˆi) = P[βi(cˆi) < ai|βi(cˆi) > cˆi] = ai−cˆici−cˆi .
Proof: Properties 1, 2 are immediate from the algorithm. If
βi(cˆi) = cˆ
′
i > cˆi, it means the algorithm has followed algo-
rithm 2 of algorithm 2 and thus property 3 follows. Property
4 follows from the fact that distribution of βi(cˆi) is uniform in
the interval [cˆi, ci] conditional on the event βi(cˆi) > cˆi 
The algorithm that outputs the transformed allocation and the
payment is described in Algorithm 3.
ALGORITHM 3: Mechanism Transformation
Input: ∀i, bids cˆi ∈ [ci, ci], kˆi ∈ [ki, ki], parameter µ ∈ (0, 1),
allocation rule x
Output: Allocation rule x˜ and the payment rule t˜
1 Obtain modified bids as
(α, β) = ((α1(cˆ1), β1(cˆ1), (α2(cˆ2), β2(cˆ2)), . . . , (αn(cˆn), βn(cˆn))
2 Allocate according to x˜(cˆ, kˆ) = x(α(cˆ), kˆ)
3 Make payment to each agent i, t˜i(cˆ, kˆ) = cˆix˜i(cˆ, kˆ) + Pi, where,
Pi =
{
1
µ
xi(α(cˆ),kˆ)
F′i(βi(cˆi),cˆi)
, ifβi(cˆi) > cˆi
0, otherwise.
Proof of Theorem 6: We will prove that the transformed mech-
anism in Algorithm 3 satisfies all the properties in Theorem
4 when the input allocation rule is well-behaved and thus
is stochastic BIC and IR. Transformed allocation and pay-
ment rule are denoted by x˜ and t˜ respectively. We denote
X˜i(cˆi, kˆi; s) = Eb−i,α[xi(α(cˆ), kˆ; s)] as the expected allocation
with the expectation taken over randomization of the algorithm
and bid profile of other agents. Similarly, we denote T˜i(cˆi, kˆi; s)
= Eb−i,α,β [ti(α(cˆ), β, kˆ; s)]. For all reward realizations s, we
will prove two properties: (1) Allocation rule X˜ is monotone
in terms of costs, and (2) the expected payment rule T˜ satis-
fies eq. (12).
The monotonicity of allocation rule X˜ follows from the mono-
tonicity of x (Lemma 5) and the monotonicity property 1 of
Algorithm 2 (Property 1, Lemma 8).
We now prove that Eb−i,α,β [Pi] =
∫ ci
cˆi
X˜i(kˆi, z; s)dz, where
the expectation is taken over bids of other players as well as
over the randomization of the Algorithm 3.
Eb−i,α,β [Pi]
= EβiEb−i,α|βi [Pi] (Pi does not depend on β−i)
= P(βi > cˆi)Eβi|βi>cˆiEb−i,α|βi [Pi] (Pi = 0 if βi = cˆi)
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= µEβi|βi>cˆiEb−i,α|βi
[
xi(α(cˆ), kˆ; s)
µF ′i(βi(cˆi), cˆi)
]
(Property 2 of Lemma 8)
= Eβi|βi>cˆi
1
F ′i(βi, cˆi)
Eb−i,α[xi(αi(βi), α−i(cˆ−i), kˆ; s)]
(Property 3 of Lemma 8)
= Eβi|βi>cˆi
X˜i(βi, kˆi; s)
F ′i(βi, cˆi)
=
∫ ci
cˆi
X˜i(z, kˆi; s)dz (Lemma 7)
We also have,
ρi(ci, kˆi; s) = T˜i(ci, kˆi; s)− ciX˜i(ci, kˆi; s) (eq. (2))
= ciX˜i(ci, cˆ−i, kˆ; s)−
∫ ci
ci
X˜i(z, kˆi; s)dz − ciX˜i(ci, kˆi; s)
= 0
Thus, ρi(cˆi, kˆi; s) = ρi(c¯i,kˆi; s) +
∫ c¯i
cˆi
Xi(z, kˆi; s)dz. Since the
allocation rule is monotone in capacity, ρi(bi; s) non-negative,
and non-decreasing in kˆi, ∀s and ∀cˆi ∈ [ci, c¯i]. 
5.2 2D-UCB: A Learning Mechanism
With the necessary machinery established, we now present the
learning mechanism given in Algorithm 4. Mechanism 2D-UCB
procures one unit at a time, learns the quality and makes the
allocation similar to 2D-OPT on the basis of learnt qualities
so far. The payment is computed with the help of transformed
mechanism given in Algorithm 3.
Theorem 9 2D-UCB is stochastic BIC and IR.
Proof: We first prove that the allocation rule produced
by 2D-UCB mechanism is well-behaved. At every time, the
mechanism allocates the unit to an agent with highest value
of Gˆi. The value of Gˆi only depends on learnt quality so far.
It is monotone in terms of cost due to regularity assumption
and monotonicity property of Algorithm 2. Thus Property 1
of well-behaved is satisfied. If an agent reduces his capacity
then he might lose an allocation since no agent is allocated
more then his bid capacity thus satisfying property 3. The
allocation rule also satisfy property 2 (IIA) since the allocation
is made to the agent with highest Gˆi and if agent i changes his
bid then it will not affect the Gˆ′is of other agents. Since the
payment structure follows from algorithm 3, and conditions of
Theorem 4 are also satisfied and thus the resulting mechanism
is stochastic BIC and IR. 
ALGORITHM 4: 2D-UCB Mechanism
Input: ∀i ∈ N , bids cˆi ∈ [ci, ci], kˆi ∈ [ki, ki], parameter
µ ∈ (0, 1), Reward parameter R
Output: A mechanism M = (x, t)
1 ∀i ∈ N , qˆ+i = 1, qˆ−i = 0, ni = 1
2 Obtain modified bids as (α, β)
3 = ((α1(cˆ1), β1(cˆ1), . . . , (αn(cˆn), βn(cˆn)) using algorithm 2
4 Allocate one unit to all agents and estimate empirical quality qˆ
5 qˆi = q˜i(i)/ni, qˆ
+
i = qˆi +
√
1
2ni
ln(t)
6 for t = n to L do
7 Compute Hi = αi +
Fi(αi|kˆi)
fi(αi|kˆi)
8 Let i = arg max{js.t.kj>nj}Rqˆ
+
j −Hj and Gˆi = Rqˆ+i −Hi
9 if Gˆj > 0 then
10 Procure the unit from agent i and update qˆi
11 qˆ+i = qˆi +
√
2
ni
ln(t)
12 else
13 break \\ Don’t allocate future units to anyone
14 Make payment to each agent i, T˜i = cˆini + Pi, where,
15
Pi =
{
1
µ
ni(ci − cˆi), ifβi > cˆi
0, otherwise.
6 Simulations
In Section 5, we have presented a learning mechanism 2D-UCB,
which embeds 2D-OPT. We have theoretically established the
optimality of 2D-OPT when the qualities of the agents are
known. A detailed regret analysis of our learning mechanism
2D-UCB will be quite involved and forms an interesting future
direction. We instead evaluate the performance of our learning
mechanism via simulations.
In the simulations, we compare the expected utility per unit
given by 2D-UCB against the optimal benchmark 2D-OPT
which is fully aware of underlying quality. Another good bench-
mark to compare against is an ε−separated mechanism. An
ε−separated mechanism allocates εL units to all the agents ir-
respective of their bids. Based on the observed realization, the
learned qualities in these rounds are used to find the allocation
and payments in (1−ε)L future rounds using 2D-OPT and also
qualities are not updated further. It is easy to verify that an
ε− separated mechanism is BIC and IR.
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For the simulations, the number of units of the item (L),
which the auctioneer wishes to procure, is chosen at first as
103 and subsequently at nine other linearly spaced steps from
103 to 105. We choose a pool of five agents(N). A unit pro-
cured from an agent i yields a Bernoulli reward with mean qi
drawn uniformly from the interval [0.5, 1]. The private types
of the agents are independently distributed and the costs are
drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. The cost and capacity are cho-
sen to be independently distributed and therefore the setup
meets regularity. The capacity is a positive integer drawn with
equal probability in the range with upper limit as L and lower
limit large enough to meet the uniform exploration. For this
type distribution, it can be shown that the virtual cost func-
tion for an agent i is Hi = 2ci by simple computation. For the
ε-separated mechanisms, we choose the number of exploration
rounds as {L1/6, L1/3, L1/2, L2/3}. A Bernoulli reward 1 of a
procured instance yields a reward of R = 30 to auctioneer. The
performance measure used is the expected average utility per
unit obtained by the auctioneer plotted as a function of the
number of units. To estimate the expected average utility, 200
independent samples are drawn from the type distribution; for
each such sample the number of units required to be procured
is varied; at each value of L multiple instances(100) of reward
realization is drawn from the true underlying quality. As L is
varied, the capacity is suitably scaled yielding a constant av-
erage utility for the benchmark as shown in fig. 2. We choose
µ = 0.1 for 2D-UCB.
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Figure 2: Comparative study of average utility per unit
The simulations indicate that all the mechanisms yield aver-
age utilities per unit which asymptotically converge to 2D-OPT.
The performance of 2D-UCB however is superior in the sense
that it approaches 2D-OPT faster.
7 Conclusion
We have studied a class of mechanisms which yield a stochastic
reward to the auctioneer following an allocation to an agent.
We have presented optimal learning mechanisms which truth-
fully elicit multiple private types. A corresponding welfare max-
imizing version follows directly from the ideas presented in this
paper. It would be interesting to study a setting where the al-
location is over a subset of agents rather than a single agent. A
complete characterization of a learning algorithm in this space
is still open as we have provided only sufficient conditions. Also,
a theoretic lower bound on regret would be interesting.
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